

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST GENOCIDE

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January 10, 2000

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RECEIVED

JAN 10 2000

Dear Mr. Hausfeld:

We understand from press reports that you are playing a leading role in the historic effort to secure restitution for Jews who lost money in Swiss bank accounts and from corporations which benefited from slave labor. We are writing to acquaint you with a new initiative called the Campaign Against Genocide in the hope that you will consider aiding it as part (directly or indirectly) of the pending settlements.

We believe there could be no more fitting memorial to the victims of Nazism than helping to launch an organization devoted to fighting the continuing threat of genocide and mass murder.

While nothing can compare to the monumental crime of the Holocaust, during the last three decades hundreds of thousands of people in Bosnia, Rwanda, Bangladesh, Burundi and Sudan have been deliberately murdered in large part because of who they were. (Many would add Tibet, East Timor, Guatemala, Chechnya, Congo and Cambodia to the list of genocides).

We developed the Campaign Against Genocide over the past year because we realized that in nearly every case of genocide, the United States and the international community knew what was happening but either delayed or refused to take effective steps to prevent or stop the killing. Tragically, the promise of "never again" is threatening to become an empty slogan. The reality is closer to "again and again."

Why, when we know so much about the past, have our leaders done so little about the present? As veteran foreign policy officials and activists, we are convinced that a large part of the answer lies in the absence of a substantial constituency of citizens demanding that the U.S. and the international community do more to prevent and stop the killing.

As the prominent journalist David Rieff wrote recently in the New York Times Magazine, "For all its influence in elite circles, the human rights constituency is a tiny fraction of that commanded by grass-roots organizations of either the left or the right. Without a broad base of support, it may have reached the limit of its effectiveness."

The Campaign Against Genocide aims to become a self-sustaining membership organization comprised of tens of thousands of citizens. It will use state-of-the-art electronic communication to mobilize the U.S. and the international community against the threat of genocide. Its members and supporters will be retirees and students, religious-based activists and returned Peace Corps volunteers, listeners to National Public radio and members of local foreign policy discussion groups, teachers and ethnic community members, men and women of all backgrounds who are concerned about the horrors they see and hear on the world news.

Yet building this organization will take time. And work. And money. And before it can become self-sustaining, it will need a few friends to help it along. Over the last year, in consultation with some of the nation's top direct mail consultants and nongovernmental organizations, we have developed a business plan and membership campaign that will enable the Campaign to become self-sustaining over a three-to-five year span. Until it does, it will need approximately \$3 million in financing.


That's why we are writing to you. We believe it would give an additional meaning to the settlement you helped to achieve if a small fraction of the monies awarded in the case were used to help launch the Campaign—without, of course, denying anyone their just compensation.

We are enclosing a complete prospectus, including financial projections, for your review. We hope you won't mind if we take the liberty of calling you in the next few days to discuss any ideas you might have of how we might proceed.

Thank you for your time and consideration.

Sincerely,


Steve Solarz
(former Congressman)


Steve Weissman


David Aronson

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST GENOCIDE: A PROSPECTUS

More than fifty years have passed since the discovery of the Nazi death camps stirred international outrage and led to the promise -- enshrined in the United Nations' Convention Against Genocide -- that such monumental crimes would never be allowed to happen again. But the specter of genocide endures. In recent years, hundreds of thousands of people in Bosnia, Rwanda, Bangladesh, Sudan, and Burundi have been deliberately murdered in large part because of who they were. Many observers would add Tibet, East Timor, Kosovo, Guatemala, Indonesia, Chechnya, Congo, and Cambodia to the list of countries in which genocide has occurred.

In nearly every case, the United States and the international community was aware of what was happening but either delayed or refused to take effective steps to prevent and stop the killing. As a result, the promise of "never again," the most solemn obligation the world has ever undertaken, is threatening to become an empty slogan; the reality is closer to "again and again."

Why is the world's conscience so slow and ineffectual in the face of genocidal violence? Why, when we know so much, have we done so little? Why have we not learned more from our experience and memory of crimes against humanity about how to prevent new genocides?

As veteran foreign policy officials, scholars and activists, we have become convinced that a large part of the answer lies in the absence of a substantial, organized political constituency demanding that the U.S. and the international community do more to prevent and stop the killing. Virtually everyone in the humanitarian and human rights communities agrees that building such a constituency is a necessary step in altering the political calculations that determine policy. It is time someone attempted to make that goal a reality.

The current nongovernmental response to genocide and other mass violence -- editorials, ad hoc human rights reports, letter writing campaigns for individual victims, testimony at congressional hearings, publications and discussion groups for the cognoscenti, humanitarian relief and international trials -- has helped to foster public concern about human rights issues and brought them to the forefront of foreign policy discussions. There is now a considerable debate about the proper role of human rights concerns in determining policy and a greater public willingness to intervene in cases of mass murder.

Unfortunately, the absence of an organized political movement harnessing public outrage has given political leaders the latitude to avoid taking timely or effective action. And with each successive failure, inactivity becomes a more routine and acceptable response. Even in Kosovo, NATO military action did not prevail before 10,000 civilian deaths, a massive outpouring of refugees, and considerable destruction of the civil infrastructure. (Indeed, the slow and limited

nature of NATO's response to Kosovo highlighted the lack of adequate international support to prevent or stop genocide in areas outside of NATO's immediate concern.)

Our new organization, the CAMPAIGN AGAINST GENOCIDE, seeks to prevent and stop genocide by monitoring critical situations, devising and lobbying on behalf of appropriate U.S. and international policy responses, educating the public about the historical threat of genocide, and **most importantly, by mobilizing mass political constituencies to demand that the most powerful international actors do more to prevent and stop the violence.** It is based on two fundamental beliefs: first, that both our national interest and morality require combating genocide; and second, that only a mobilized citizenry can generate the political will to make sure that steps are taken to stop or prevent genocide --- wherever and whenever it threatens to occur.

The CAMPAIGN AGAINST GENOCIDE aims to become, at first in the U.S. and then elsewhere, a self-sustaining membership organization comprised of tens of thousands of citizens who share these convictions and are prepared to act politically. It is this priority for **citizen participation and political action**, as well as **the absolute evil it targets**, that distinguishes the CAMPAIGN AGAINST GENOCIDE from other international humanitarian, conflict-prevention and human rights groups.

Who are the potential members of the CAMPAIGN AGAINST GENOCIDE? They are retirees and students, religious-based activists and returned Peace Corps volunteers, listeners to National Public Radio and members of local foreign policy discussion groups, teachers and ethnic community members, men and women of all backgrounds who are concerned about the horrors they see and hear on the world news. If 300,000 Americans are members of Amnesty International, aiding prisoners of conscience around the world, 200,000 are members of the Southern Poverty Law Center, combating hate crimes in the U.S., and 200,000 are members of Common Cause, attempting to reform the corrupt campaign finance system, then surely there is a significant "market" for the conscience-based mass organization we wish to build.

The CAMPAIGN AGAINST GENOCIDE will utilize existing networks of scholars, journalists, and nongovernmental groups to monitor actual and potential conflict; propose and lobby for effective and politically feasible policies to prevent and stop violence (including longer-term measures for political reconciliation); and educate members and supporters and mobilize them to influence government action through the distribution of legislative and other "issue alerts," identification of key activists, creation of phone and electronic mobilization networks, and forging of national and local coalitions with sympathetic religious, ethnic, humanitarian, professional and other groups.

GENOCIDE: WHAT DO WE MEAN?

The United Nations Convention Against Genocide, passed in 1948 after two years of vigorous debate and ratified by 106 countries, defines genocide as any of the following acts undertaken with the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical [sic], racial or religious group, as such: a) murdering, b) causing serious bodily or mental harm, c) inflicting conditions calculated to cause physical destruction, and d) establishing measures to prevent births or transfer children."

This definition has not been free of controversy. The Soviet Union, for example, successfully opposed the original definition of genocide proposed to the UN, which would have included political opponents in the list of potential targets of genocidal violence. As a result, the many millions of victims of Stalin's purges and Mao's "Cultural Revolution," as well as the million or more Cambodians slaughtered by the Khmer Rouge, would not, according to the UN's definition, be considered victims of genocide. More recently, a number of scholars and activists have questioned why categories like gender, sexual orientation, disability, economic status, and educational level were omitted from the list.¹

Moreover, there are practical problems in applying the definition. It provides no guidance about the numerical threshold at which violence against a group becomes "genocide." Literally speaking, the murder of a single person could be interpreted as an effort to destroy "part" of a group. Another difficulty is that the perpetrators of genocide rarely state -- as they did in Nazi Germany and Rwanda -- their intention to exterminate a group "as such." For example, in Bosnia or Burundi this genocidal purpose was a major spur to action, but was entwined with and publicly masked behind other motives such as political domination and perceived self-defense. In assessing intent, one also faces the difficulty of distinguishing concerted, government-sponsored action from sporadic and spontaneous mass outbursts.²

It is crucial to arrive at a clear and widely accepted definition of genocide because a determination that genocide is occurring or threatening to occur triggers obligations by the signatories of the U.N. Convention to prevent, stop, or punish it. For this reason, the U.S. and other governments have sometimes declined to refer to ongoing events as a genocide—even when they clearly knew that they were. The CAMPAIGN AGAINST GENOCIDE will develop and promulgate a strict definition and clear evidentiary criteria to enable it to make unambiguous, categorical judgments regarding the occurrence of genocide. While our central focus will be on utilizing the U.N. definition — the ethnic and religious forces in contemporary conflicts furnish a large agenda for political action -- our definition will be flexible enough to respond to an unfolding, Cambodia-type situation where mass political killings threaten to destroy a large part of a country's non-combatant population.

The post Cold War era is characterized by armed conflict in many countries (See Table 1). A principal factor in these conflicts is ethnic/religious tension, so genocide is a constant threat. In the last 10 years alone, genocide or large-scale massacres foreshadowing genocide have occurred in at least the following places: Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, Burundi, Chechnya, Sudan, Congo, Northern Iraq, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and most recently, East Timor. Other areas of communal conflicts where genocide could erupt include Nagorno-Karabakh, Kashmir, and Sri Lanka.

The CAMPAIGN AGAINST GENOCIDE will cover both clear genocides and large-scale massacres which might signal future genocides. We will focus on countries where a substantial portion of the population is affected or at risk, and will assess intent, motive, the numbers of people involved, and political context in determining the reality and threat of genocide.

INTERNATIONAL ACTION CAN HELP STOP OR PREVENT GENOCIDE

A half century after the Holocaust, the world continues to be tortured by questions about what it might have been done to forestall or at least diminish the genocide. Nonetheless, it is widely recognized that in just the last few years the U.S. and the international community have failed to take timely, often modest, actions that held the potential to stop or prevent genocide or large-scale ethnic or religious massacres in Bosnia, Rwanda, Congo, Guatemala, Burundi, Chechnya, Sudan, Kosovo, and East Timor.

For example,

- In Bosnia, many former officials believe NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb artillery and other military installations in the fall of 1992 could have produced a negotiated settlement early in the conflict. Such an approach might also have compelled adherence to Western peace plans in 1993-94 or deterred attacks on Bosnian Muslim safe-havens. Many maintain that a combination of air and naval action against Serbia (in response to Serbia's attack on Croatia) and U.N. peacekeepers for Bosnia in 1991 would have completely deterred genocide in Bosnia.³
- In Rwanda, the former U.N. Force Commanding General, an authoritative international study sponsored by several Western Governments, and (obliquely) President Clinton have indicated that the Security Council's failure to sustain its small force in Rwanda when massacres began in April 1994, and increase it modestly in a timely way, assured the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Rwandans.⁴ Many analysts also believe that deployment of a proposed multinational force could have saved tens of thousands of Rwandan refugees' lives in the Eastern Congo in late 1996.
- In Kosovo, NATO eventually stopped ethnic cleansing and genocidal killing, but the failures of NATO to address Kosovo during the Bosnia settlement negotiations in 1995, to develop a coherent policy toward the crisis in 1996-98, to correctly estimate the consequences of its air attacks, and its premature decision to rule out ground troops, all contributed to unnecessary death, displacement, and destruction.

- On the more hopeful side, after three decades of world indifference to Burundian genocide, regional African nations' 1996 decision to combine economic sanctions with a process of intense political mediation fostered some fragile political progress in Burundi.⁵

The broader challenge to the international community, illustrated by the continuing crises in the Balkans and Central Africa, is to go beyond ad hoc injections of military force to foster long-range political settlements that diminish the threat of genocide. Experience in such post-conflict societies as El Salvador and South Africa suggest that policies promoting democratic power-sharing, economic justice, historical accountability, community education, and regional stability hold the promise of breaking the cycles of violence. We will develop specific policy proposals based on analysis of political experiences, and mobilize and lobby for their adoption.

It is important to underline that even beyond or moral requirement to oppose genocide, it is in our national interest to develop early and effective responses to emerging crises. Experience in places such as the Balkans or Central Africa shows that such crises, left to evolve, frequently degenerate into catastrophic events that compel the attention of policymakers. Often, by that point, the cost of humanitarian relief or more forceful forms of intervention is vastly higher than it might have been. Furthermore, inaction in one place contributes to the erosion of the international standard against genocide, including areas of strategic concern. A military response must be considered a last resort, and can be more easily averted if decisive action is taken early enough.

Let us be clear: A strong U.S. policy against genocide is not a recipe for perpetual unilateral military intervention. Rather, it involves the creation of a priority for the entire international community that can be supported by the U.S. in a variety of ways.

If the CAMPAIGN AGAINST GENOCIDE were operational today, it could be working to develop support for longer-term measures to prevent the Balkan conflict from spreading to Macedonia, Albania, Greece, and Turkey. It could be trying to mobilize backing for policies promoting political negotiations and international peacekeeping to help stem the spread of genocide in Central Africa, keeping close watch on events in East Timor, and advocating for greater resources for Sierra Leone. It could also be monitoring fast-changing political developments in Kashmir, the Sudan, and certain areas in the former Soviet Union, mobilizing political support for new policies to prevent or stop mass ethnic and religious killing.

THE PROMISE OF POLITICAL ACTIVISM

In the overwhelming majority of countries, foreign policy is formulated by the President or Prime Minister with little input from the legislature or general public. This is true even for democracies, although regular elections produce some significant constraints on decision-makers. In the U.S., the legislature and public have historically played a larger role, but the Cold War centralized policy making in the "Imperial Presidency." Even so, public and congressional pressures influenced U.S. diplomacy on such issues such as support for Israel, opposition to the

Castro regime in Cuba and apartheid in South Africa, peacemaking in Central America, and even nuclear policy.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, there is much greater scope for popular involvement in foreign policy making in both the U.S. and other countries. In the U.S., congressional pressure and unorganized public opinion played important roles in fostering both the 1995 U.S. military intervention to stop genocidal fighting in Bosnia (See Table 2) and the massive Rwandan refugee relief operation following the 1994 genocide. As a result of the reaction to the Rwandan genocide, there is a strong movement in countries like France and Belgium for greater parliamentary participation in foreign-policy decision-making. The number of democracies has grown significantly. And the role of NGOs and public opinion continues to evolve, as demonstrated by the rapid success of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines.

Polls consistently show strong unorganized political support for action against genocide. In July 1994, a poll taken by the Program on International Policy Attitudes of the University of Maryland found that when citizens were asked, "If genocidal situations occur, do you think that the U.N., including the U.S., should intervene with whatever force is necessary to stop the acts of genocide?" Sixty-five percent said "always" or "in most cases," while 23 percent said, "only when American interests are also involved," and just 6 percent said "never." Concerning Bosnia, President Clinton's chief political strategist wrote,

...When the president asked me to conduct a poll to help him figure out how to explain to a skeptical nation why he was sending troops to Bosnia, we found that the people were willing to send troops to stop the killing of women and children and to stop the practice of genocide. They were not particularly persuaded by the strength of the NSC [National Security Council] arguments: the strength of the NATO alliance, the need to help out Europe so Europe would help us fight terrorism, and the global credibility of the United States. ⁶

The U.S. is the most powerful country in the world and the one most open to public participation in foreign policy. If the anti-genocide sentiment that already exists can be organized into a consistent political force, there is real hope that we can turn the U.S. and governments it influences away from the tragic missed opportunities of the past.

PROPOSED ACTIVITIES

(1) The CAMPAIGN AGAINST GENOCIDE will **monitor** situations where genocide or large-scale massacres threatening genocide are occurring or could develop and **propose detailed policies to help end or prevent the violence**. To accomplish this objective it will:

a) Synthesize information from a wide variety of sources including governmental and inter-governmental early warning networks, the world press, networks of scholars, activists, journalists, and worldwide non-governmental organizations such as the International Crisis Group and the Committee of Conscience of the Holocaust Museum. It will coordinate information exchanges through its state-of-the-art electronic and internet communication sites;

b) Combine its own policy analysis capacity with the best academic, non-academic and policy making expertise available (including current and former policy makers and citizens of the crisis state) to develop effective and realistic proposals for U.S. and international action; and

c) Accumulate knowledge of individual cases to develop a menu of cost-effective policy responses to genocidal conflict.

(2) Most fundamentally, the CAMPAIGN AGAINST GENOCIDE will help create **political constituencies**, beginning in the U.S., that will support international action to stop or prevent genocide and genocidal massacres. To accomplish this objective, it will:

a) Develop, inform and educate a broad-based membership to financially and politically sustain the organization and its activities. Potential members will be largely targeted through a sophisticated and sustained direct mail campaign based on careful market testing. In addition, the CAMPAIGN AGAINST GENOCIDE aims to become a pioneer among non-profits in exploiting the global reach of new information technologies such as e-mail and the internet.

b) Develop an aggressive public education program targeting school, community and religious groups, linking the historical experience of genocide to lessons relevant to the present-day. A central element of this effort will be a yearly "Never Again" Day, an annual commemoration promoting a decisive response to genocide whenever and wherever it erupts.

c) Wage an aggressive press campaign, nationally and locally, including press releases, editorial board advisories, appearances in the electronic media, and the personal cultivation of key journalists, to insure that the organization's positions receive widespread attention;

d) Enlist both members and supporters in our lobbying efforts on behalf of policy proposals directed at the U.S. Congress and Executive, as well as U.S.-influenced intergovernmental organizations, and other governments. Legislative and other "issue alerts" will be widely distributed. A network of key activists will be created and trained in citizen lobbying. Telephone trees and electronic networks will be utilized to target citizen lobbying on key government officials. National and local coalitions will be forged with similarly minded mass-based groups (particularly church, ethnic and humanitarian organizations), which will be encouraged to activate their constituencies.

PLANNED PUBLICATIONS

Central to the proposed activities will be the following publications:

1) **Web Presence:**

The CAMPAIGN AGAINST GENOCIDE will aim to make pioneering use of modern information technology, from issuing rapid e-mail alerts and creating a sophisticated web presence to distributing intelligence, developing networks of activists, and linking area experts in real time communication to assess situations and craft policy recommendations. The centerpiece of our Web presence will be a world map indicating areas of concern. A three-stage code (amber, yellow, red) will indicate the severity of the situation, from potential for violence to actual

genocide. Viewers will be able to click on countries for regularly updated reports and background information. The web site will also contain background information on the organization (such as the annual report and bimonthly newsletter), historical material on genocide, photographic and video documentation, a list of links, FAQs, banners promoting action and donations, and a substantial How You Can Help page including direct e-mail and fax communications to congressional and executive offices.

2) Bimonthly Newsletter

This will be the primary vehicle for keeping members and contributors informed of activities, successes, issues of concern, and organizational matters.

3) Press Releases, Editorial Board advisories, and Thematic Analyses of Policy Responses to Genocide

These will be published on an ad-hoc basis and distributed to media, think tanks and other politically influential people and organizations.

4) Urgent Action Alerts

These will be published and distributed to members, supporters and cooperating coalition members as needed, providing timely information and political direction.

5) Never Again Observance Day Kits

These kits will consist of brochures, posters, a short 30-40 minute documentary on genocide and the need for a political mobilization campaign, membership campaign material, and current Urgent Action Alerts.

STAFFING & GOVERNANCE:

The CAMPAIGN AGAINST GENOCIDE will initially employ a staff of seven, including five professionals, and hire additional consultants as needed. The five professionals will consist of a co-director for government affairs and policy analysis; a co-director for media relations, publications, and research; an associate director for membership and field activities; and an associate director for development and fundraising; and an assistant director for government affairs. It will add additional positions as the organization grows. Staff will be selected through a competitive search process and chosen for their experience, dedication, and proven achievements. Job descriptions and position requirements will be elaborated in consultation with appropriate experts.

The two co-directors will share responsibility for overall management and organization policy. One will focus on government policy analysis and political mobilization. Primary responsibilities will be to develop a clear and succinct set of policy recommendations in response to genocidal situations and to develop and implement lobbying strategies for their

implementation. The other co-director will monitor situations of concern worldwide, supervise publications, develop press campaigns, and oversee fundraising activities.

Stephen R. Weissman, formerly Staff Director of the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa, was instrumental in such legislative achievements as economic sanctions against the apartheid regime in South Africa; curbs on U.S. aid to human rights violators, and reorienting U.S. foreign assistance towards sustainable, equitable development. He has been senior governance adviser to the U.S. Agency for International Development, associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Ford Foundation program officer. Author of *A Culture of Deference: Congress's Failure of Leadership in Foreign Policy*, and *American Foreign Policy in the Congo 1960-64*, Weissman taught Political Science at Fordham University, the University of Texas, and Howard University. As Legislative Representative with Public Citizen, a 150,000 member consumer and public interest advocacy group, he has been involved with both lobbying, membership and field education and mobilization activities.

David Aronson is currently acting director of public affairs at the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, where he manages press relations and oversees publications on a wide array of civil rights issues. He was formerly an editor at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he specialized in international migration and complex emergencies and was a critical voice in central African issues. He previously worked at the Southern Poverty Law Center's education program, *Teaching Tolerance*, where he helped edit a magazine for 250,000 subscribers and develop and promulgate anti-prejudice programs. A communications and internet expert, he has written for a wide variety of publications, including the *New York Times*, the *International Herald Tribune*, the *World Policy Journal*, *Dissent*, the *Washington Post*, and the *Christian Science Monitor*.

A **Board of Advisers**, composed of distinguished men and women known for their commitment to human rights, will provide informal guidance and support to the organization. Their endorsements will bring international legitimacy and aid particularly in the launching of this new initiative. They will be listed on the CAMPAIGN AGAINST GENOCIDE stationery and receive regular updates on the organization's projects and publications. Among the board members to date are Elie Wiesel, Pauline Baker, Michael Berenbaum, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Father Theodore Hesburgh, Raul Hilberg, Rabbi Michael Lerner, Representative Tom Lantos, Leonard Rubenstein, former Senator Paul Simon, and Roger Wilkins.

The CAMPAIGN AGAINST GENOCIDE Education Fund has just been incorporated in Washington, DC and has applied for 501(c)3 tax deductible status to the IRS. We anticipate creating a 501(c)4 lobbying arm as we begin to solicit memberships. Handling these legal matters for us *pro bono* is the distinguished Washington law firm of Covington and Burling. A **Board of Directors** will assume final fiduciary responsibility for the two organizations, and will operate according to the customary legal specifications. The Directors will consist of select advisory board members, senior staff, major donors, and prominent scholars and activists. An estimated annual expenditures budget is found in Appendix One.

BUDGET & FUNDRAISING:

The CAMPAIGN AGAINST GENOCIDE aims to become a self-sustaining organization financed primarily by membership obtained through direct mail, the internet and other electronic means. In addition, it will develop other enduring sources of support through planned giving and other large donor programs.

During its first four years, the CAMPAIGN AGAINST GENOCIDE will require start-up financing to launch its operations and help subsidize the initial net losses of fundraising. Direct mail, used by many charitable organizations, is a capital intensive investment that more than pays for itself in the medium term as the cost of acquiring new members is offset by membership renewals and responses to special appeals. Staff has consulted with several of the nation's most successful direct mail nonprofit experts, and developed a detailed program (see Appendix Two A) that will enable it to yield an income sufficient to cover operational expenses within three to five years. Internet fundraising is anticipated to yield positive, albeit less substantial, dividends from the beginning. Its costs are therefore built into the income stream projected in Appendix Two B.

A balance sheet, showing projected revenues and expenditures for each of the first four years, is presented in Appendix Two B. It is estimated that \$3.0 million in outside funding will be required to meet the anticipated deficit for the initial four years. However, by year four the organization will hopefully have become self-sufficient, relying on membership dues, internet and other giving to meet both its operational and its fundraising expenses.

¹ Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981), esp. pp 19-39, 57-83; William Schabas, The Genocide Convention at Fifty (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1999).

² See n. 1 and Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr, "Systematic Early Warning of Humanitarian Emergencies," November 1997, and Rene Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, 1996).

³ Warren Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its Destroyers (New York: Times Books, 1996), especially pp. xi-xvi, 156, 209, 225-26, and 241-42; Statement of General Galvin in House Committee on Armed Services, The Policy Implications of U.S. Involvement in Bosnia: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, 103rd Congress, 1st session, May 25 and 26, 1993, pp. 4-5; and Don Oberdorfer, "A Bloody Failure in the Balkans," Washington Post, February 8, 1993, pp. A1, A14.

⁴ Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwandan Experience, Study 2: Early Warning and Conflict Management (Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996).

⁵ Stephen R. Weissman, Preventing Genocide in Burundi: Lessons from International Diplomacy, Peaceworks No. 22 (U.S. Institute of Peace, July 1998).

⁶ Dick Morris, Behind the Oval Office (Los Angeles: Renaissance Books, 1999), p. 248.